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The War on Terror: Where We Are and How We Got There

In choosing this topic, where we are in the war on terror and how we got there,
it occurred to me that it would be an appropriate topic for me to address, not only
because it is a subject that I have been involved with on and off for about eighteen
years—ever since a prosecution that eventually came to be known as United States v.
Rahman1 landed on my desk as a federal district judge—but also because we have just
celebrated (if that is the word), quietly (and that definitely is the word), what was to
have been the one-year anniversary of the closing of the facility at Guantánamo
Bay.
Now, as you all know, the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay is still open. So
I thought I would deal with that topic, how it came to remain open, and also where
we are on the war on Islamist terrorism. This entails a discussion of not only why
Guantánamo is still open, but also how we got here, and perhaps where we are likely
to go. I am going to provide some historical review, both to help find answers to
these questions and so that you can understand why the answers are somewhat less
than definite and a good deal less than satisfactory.
Based on the evidence that I have seen, the first encounter of this country with
Islamist terrorism did not start on September 11, 2001, or indeed on February 26,
1993, which is the date of what was then known as the World Trade Center bombing
and later became known as the first World Trade Center bombing. It began in the
late 1980s, specifically, at a shooting range out in Calverton, Long Island, when a
group of FBI agents approached what they thought was a bunch of people who were
taking rather aggressive target practice. The agents thought that they would give the
group a “toss,” as they say in the business, and get their identification, and so on.
These people put off the FBI, challenged them, and said that the agents were engaged
in what is now known as profiling. The agents, being polite and politically correct,
backed off.
Fast forward to 1990. In November of 1990, a right-wing Israeli politician named
Meir Kahane was assassinated at a ballroom here in Manhattan after giving a speech.
The assailant was quickly caught—a man named El Sayyid Nosair. It was immediately
pronounced to be the lone act of a lone actor. The case wound up being so overtried,
notwithstanding that Nosair had committed the crime in front of an audience about
as large as this one, that he was actually acquitted of murder. But he was convicted of
using the gun with which he had committed the murder, and was sentenced to seven
and one-third years to twenty-two years in jail. What we now refer to as jihadi
literature was seized from his apartment. It discussed, among other things, toppling
tall buildings in order to bring down western civilization. But nobody paid any
attention to that; it was put in a warehouse and went largely unexamined.
It was not, however, an isolated act by an isolated actor. In February 1993, the
first World Trade Center bombing occurred, killing six people, injuring hundreds of
others, and causing millions of dollars of property damage. Among the demands of
those who carried out that bombing was the demand that Nosair be released from
jail. When an amateur video of Kahane’s speech was reviewed, it was discovered that
1.

189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999).
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one of the people involved in the 1993 bombing was actually present in the ballroom
that night. In fact, Nosair was supposed to have made his escape by getting into a
cab that was driven by another of the 1993 plotters, but he jumped into the wrong
cab and therefore was captured. Also, it turned out that those people, Nosair, and
others had been present on that day in Calverton, Long Island, when the FBI agents
challenged them for taking aggressive target practice.
The response to the 1993 bombing was, of course, the conventional response—
bring the perpetrators to justice. And they were brought to justice; the 1993 bombers
were convicted at a separate trial. Their spiritual leader, Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman,
known as the blind sheik, and nine or so others, including Nosair, were convicted of
an overarching plot that included the Kahane murder, the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing, and a plan to blow up landmarks around New York City. I should tell you
that one of the other goals of that conspiracy was to assassinate Egypt’s President
Hosni Mubarak when he visited New York—shades of today’s headlines. Abdel
Rahman, even at that time, had an impressive background. He was not only the
spiritual advisor behind the 1993 bombing; he had been the spiritual advisor to the
assassins of Anwar Sadat in 1981, and he was later, from jail, to issue the fatwa that
provided Osama bin Laden with a theological justification for 9/11.
Here I should add that, given what is going on in Egypt today, the western world
is, I think, quite fortunate that Abdel Rahman is in jail because he is the sort of
charismatic figure who actually could have been, and in fact aspired to be, an
Egyptian Khomeini, 2 complete with recorded sermons distributed to his followers.
The possibility of a bad outcome today would be a lot more substantial if he were on
the street. Although the 1993 bombing led, I think, to the debut of the phrase
“wake-up call,” in fact there was virtually no public focus at the time on what we
were really dealing with and what we were up against.
I stated that from what I have seen, this country’s first encounter with Islamists,
or Islamism, occurred in the late 1980s out in Calverton, Long Island. But that was
not Islamism’s first encounter with this country. The first encounter actually goes
back to the late 1940s, when a man named Sayyid Qutb, who had been something of
a hell-raiser in Egypt, won a traveling fellowship, largely to get him out of the
country. Qutb chose to travel to the United States. Specifically, he went to Greeley,
Colorado. Now, it would be hard to think of a more placid place than Greeley,
Colorado, in the late 1940s. But Qutb was absolutely mortified by what he saw. The
haircuts, the enthusiasm for sports, the political system, the mingling of the sexes in
church—Qutb was outraged. He went back to Egypt, quit the civil service, and
joined up with an organization that was already in existence, having been founded in
the 1920s, called the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood had been
2.

Born in Iran in 1902, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was a young seminary teacher who later become a
leader of the Islamic revolution. A man who hated Western ways, he seized the U.S. embassy in Iran
and held fifty-two persons hostage. Khomeini, who died in 1989, was responsible for the deaths of
thousands during the last decade of his life. See Milton Viorst, Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini, TIME
Mag. (Apr. 13, 1998), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,988165,00.html.
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founded in Egypt by a man called Hassan al-Banna, who was assassinated the year
that Qutb left for the United States.
Although the Muslim Brotherhood welcomed Gamal Abdel Nasser’s coup in
19523 against the British monarchy, believing that it would end corruption and bring
about an Islamist state, they again were disappointed when Nasser did not even ban
the consumption of alcohol. Qutb continued his agitation, was in and out of jail, was
eventually hanged in 1966, and became something of a contemporary saint. Many
members of the Muslim Brotherhood fled to Saudi Arabia, where they found refuge
and ideological sustenance. Qutb’s brother, Muhammad Qutb, was among those
who fled, and he taught the doctrine in Saudi Arabia. Among his students was a
man named Ayman al-Zawahri, an Egyptian, who was number two in al-Qaeda,
second to Osama bin Laden, and bin Laden himself then simply the pampered child
of one of the richest construction families in Saudi Arabia.
In 1996, and reiterated in 1998, was bin Laden’s declaration of war on the United
States, which I think was treated here in the United States as quaint. Imagine some
fellow in a cave in Afghanistan declaring war on the United States. Then came the
bombing of the East African embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. The response
was another “Bring them to justice!” series of calls and actually an indictment that
named bin Laden as a co-defendant. Regrettably, bin Laden did not seem to have
been impressed, or at least if he was impressed he was not deterred, because in 2000
we had the bombing of the USS Cole. This had actually been preceded by an attempt
to bomb another U.S. destroyer called The Sullivans, which failed only because the
barge carrying the explosives sank.
Throughout this period we heard about terrorism, but not about what the people
who were practicing terrorism thought. And unless you attended one or another of
the trials involved, there was no suggestion that we should do anything other than
round up the perpetrators after the fact and bring them to justice. Notwithstanding
bin Laden’s declarations, plural, of war and his detailed description of his grounds
for the declarations, all of this came upon us as something of a surprise on September
11, 2001, when we finally got specific, or should have gotten specific, about what we
were supposed to be waking up to.
President George W. Bush promised to put things on a different footing. To the
cries of “Bring them to justice!” was added the cry, “Bring justice to them.” But,
regrettably, there was not, in fact, time to work out a long-term strategy and a clear
focus on precisely what we were dealing with. It was announced we were involved in
a war on terror—not a war on Islamist terror and certainly not a war on militant
Islamism. And it is hard, for a number of reasons, to blame anybody involved,
including the President. This war was something that had to be fit into the grid of
American domestic life and political history, and we were very much on guard at the
time, and still are, against the repetition of our treatment of the Japanese during
3.

Appointed in 1954, Gamal Abdel Nasser was the second president of the Arab Republic of Egypt. “He
was the first native Egyptian to rule Egypt in over 2500 years.” Arab Unity: Nasser’s Revolution, Al
Jazeera (June 20, 2008), http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/arabunity/2008/02/200852517252821627.
html.
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World War II and of fomenting religious and ethnic tension in this country. We are
also a society that is reluctant to examine other people’s religions.
For those two reasons we shun the notion of a war on any movement that is, or
claims to be, inspired by a religion. Indeed, President Bush went out of his way to
avoid inflaming passions, going so far as to tell us that, as he put it, “Islam is a
religion of peace.” Second, there was a sense within the Bush administration that
this was not simply about an organization called al-Qaeda, based in Afghanistan, but
that it was about a more widespread tendency—although it remained unclear how
widespread, and precisely what, that was.
There has been of course a great deal of discussion about whether the word “war”
adequately describes the War on Terror in either intellectual or practical terms, and I
can probably spend all my time here discussing that issue alone. I think it is enough
to suggest that it is the most serviceable term that we have, and “war” is certainly a
lot better, in my view, than the term “foreign contingency operation,” which is the
term favored by the current secretary of Homeland Security. I do acknowledge that
there are not only intellectual and practical difficulties with the term “war,” but there
are legal difficulties as well if we are talking about building a legal architecture that
not only gives the President the powers that he needs but at the same time allows for
the kind of accountability for the use of those powers that can sustain them over a
long period of time.
To put it in very mundane terms, it is very hard to sustain public awareness of a
war when everybody can still make restaurant reservations and go to the movies.
Despite a certain lack of strategic focus, there were, in fact, many successes during
those first years of the War on Terror, the most notable being that there were, for the
seven-plus years following 9/11, no successful attacks on this country. A great deal of
this success, I believe, was due to the CIA interrogation program, which involved
sifting through literally tens of thousands of detainees, focusing on those who seemed
to have the most potential for providing us with intelligence, and questioning them,
even vigorously at times.
CIA agents were knowledgeable in—and people other than those who actually
debriefed the detainees were schooled in—what became known as “enhanced
interrogation techniques,” which I think was probably one of the worst public
relations campaigns since New Coke. It sounds like a washday product, doesn’t it? I
think harsh techniques, or coercive techniques, would have been a whole lot more
accurate, and in the end a whole lot less harmful because when you use a euphemism
like “enhanced,” it sounds as if you are trying to hide something that you believe to
be horrible and that you are ashamed of. I think that was a disastrous choice.
We actually learned a great deal through the CIA program. In fact, if you focus
on only three of the detainees, Abu Zubaydah, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (also
known as KSM), and Abd al Rahim al Nashiri, you find that we got a huge trove of
information. Zubaydah was a lieutenant high up and close to Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed and close to Osama bin Laden. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, I think,
needs no introduction to this audience; he was the man who planned 9/11. And
Nashiri was the man who was the architect of the USS Cole attacks.
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Some important things we learned from Zubaydah, according to George Tenet
and General Michael Hayden, both former heads of the CIA, included information
that led to the arrest of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who was the operational supervisor of
9/11. We frustrated an attack on the Canary Wharf in England and on London’s
Heathrow Airport. We got Jose Padilla, known for plotting to plant a dirty bomb in
this country and actually prosecuted for something a whole lot more doable and a
whole lot more sinister: namely, getting apartments in Florida, filling them with gas,
and then detonating them using cell phones.
We also learned from Zubaydah that it was okay for members of al-Qaeda to talk
when they reached the breaking point, so long as they resisted to that limit. He said
at one point, “Do this for all the brothers.” That is, bring them to the breaking point.
And that was something that proved enormously valuable with Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed when we finally captured him because, when he finally got to the
breaking point, he gave chalk talks. He became a lecturer on the subject of al-Qaeda,
how it was organized, how it moved money, and how it attracted adherents.
We also learned specific information from KSM that resulted in the capture of
people who were planning to develop a biological weapons capability in this country.
And on and on. Nashiri, who was giving us stale information at the beginning,
wound up giving us information that was a whole lot fresher after he was interrogated
by the CIA.
So far as devising a way of dealing with terrorists when they came within the
jurisdiction of our legal system, that is a somewhat less successful story. President
Bush signed an executive order that there were to be military commissions right
away. But there was a delay in implementing them, due in part to negotiations with
our allies, including the British, who at first insisted that their nationals be tried first
and then objected to many features of the military commissions, which of course
would have had to apply to everyone. In the end, the U.S. government released
several British nationals to Great Britain rather than adjust the procedures, including
some British nationals who were plainly guilty of war crimes.
When a mechanism was finally put in place and military commission trials were
ready to begin, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to permit President Bush on his own
authority to establish a system of military commissions, and so the Congress
obligingly passed the Military Commissions Act.4 By the time the legal challenges
to the act had been exhausted, the principal architects of 9/11 were in custody—
including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the others who would never have been
captured but for the CIA program.
We were at the point where Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s trial was ready to start.
He had offered to plead guilty. But by the time that happened, we had a new
President, and President Barack Obama disclosed that he would, number one, close
Guantánamo within the year, and, number two, immediately shut down the CIA
interrogation program and limit interrogation techniques to the Army Field Manual,
4.

Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006), amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574–614 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
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which is generally available on the Internet and has been used for decades as a
training manual for terrorists.5 Additionally, President Obama shut down the military
commissions pending a study, which as far as I know has not yet been completed.
The point of these orders, according to the Obama administration, was to
“restore” standards of due process, and constitutional standards generally, and to
retake the moral high ground. I do not know how many of you saw the videotape of
the signing of these orders, but there was one moment that I found especially telling.
After President Obama signed the order to close Guantánamo, he asked whether
anybody had prepared or drafted an order for any procedures on how the closing was
going to be done, and a voice off-camera said that they were working on it. For me,
that was a terrifying moment.
As regards Guantánamo, it is a military, not a CIA, facility. I visited Guantánamo
in February of 2008. It is a state-of-the-art detention and trial facility. I have visited
not only maximum security but medium security facilities in this country, including,
principally, federal facilities, and I will tell you that Guantánamo compares favorably
with them. I was able to see the high-value detainees, other than Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed, being monitored on closed-circuit television. KSM was out of his cell
visiting with a delegation from the International Committee of the Red Cross so
that he could report to them on how terribly he was being treated. Nonetheless, I did
get to visit his cell and found that it included, in the adjoining room, an exercise
facility that included an elliptical machine that was the same make and model as the
one I used to use at the Lansburgh when I was attorney general, except that KSM
did not have to wait in line at the gym every morning.
The courtroom that exists at Guantánamo is enormously expensive. It can handle
high-security detainees and has an advanced computer system that can easily handle
classified information. The medical care at Guantánamo given to the prisoners is
better than the medical care given to their captors. The library includes many Islamic
books and other titles, as well as DVDs, but somehow the most popular title, at least
when I was down there, was Walker, Texas Ranger.
That is not to say that there is no violence at Guantánamo. There is plenty of
violence, but it is directed by the prisoners at the guards, not the other way around.
The guards have to wear plastic face shields when they walk the corridors and, of
course, when they go anywhere near the cells, to protect themselves against the
cocktails of feces, urine, spittle, semen, and other liquids that are thrown at them on
a regular basis.
As noted before, the Army Field Manual is now the limit of interrogation and, of
course, available as a training method on the Internet. The Manual is limited to
techniques that can be used by the most raw recruit. So if what is permissible is four
feet wide, the Army Field Manual sets the limit at two feet.
The current attorney general, Eric H. Holder, Jr., said during the 2008 presidential
campaign that the prior administration had, in his words,
5.

Dep’t of the Army, Field Manual 27-10: The Law of Land Warfare ¶ 31 (1956), http://www.
loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/law_warfare-1956.pdf.
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authorized the use of torture, approved of secret electronic surveillance against
American citizens, secretly detained American citizens without due process
of law, denied the writ of habeas corpus to hundreds of accused enemy
combatants and authorized the use of procedures that violate both international
law and the United States Constitution.6

The reckoning began in April 2009 with the release of the U.S. Department of
Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memos that analyzed the CIA interrogation
techniques and described why the techniques were lawful. That release was intended,
I think, to create a furor. The furor did not develop, but the memos did disclose, of
course, to any terrorist that was reading them, the limits to which the United States
would go in interrogations. But there was no outrage; in fact, in response, it was
obvious that the CIA and the Justice Department had gone to inordinate lengths to
avoid violating the torture statute.
Holder then announced that he was reopening the investigations of the CIA
agents who had conducted interrogations. These investigations had been closed years
before with detailed prosecution memos describing why they were closed. When
Holder announced that he was reopening the investigations, he conceded that he had
made that announcement and that decision without reading those prosecution
memos. In June of 2009, Ahmed Ghailani, who had been indicted for the East Africa
bombings and was being charged at Guantánamo with other crimes as well, was
brought from Guantánamo to the United States to stand trial.7
In a piece of bad timing, in November of 2009, Captain Nidal Malik Hasan,
who had been in touch with Anwar al-Awlaki, the spiritual advisor to a couple of
9/11 plotters, shouted, “Allahu Akbar,”8 before he shot soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas.
He killed thirteen soldiers and wounded about thirty. President Obama told us that
we should not jump to conclusions. Three days later, also in November of 2009,
Attorney General Holder directed an end to the military commissions proceedings
against Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and announced that he was going to bring KSM
to the United States and, specifically, to the Southern District of New York, to stand
trial. Holder announced that doing so would somehow uphold the rule of law. Which
law, I have no idea. Certainly not the Military Commissions Act because that act
directs that people who are charged with war crimes be tried before military
commissions.
Not only was this action, in essence, a failure to uphold the Military Commissions
Act, it was also a frustration of something we have been trying to do for several
hundreds of years—civilize the laws of war. Essentially the rule is that if you wear
uniforms, follow a recognized chain of command, carry your arms openly, and do
6.

Andrew C. McCarthy, ‘The Right Man’ to Protect us from Terror?, National Review Online (Jan. 13,
2009), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/226682/right-man-protect-us-terror/andrew-c-mccarthy.

7.

See Peter Finn, Guantanamo Bay Detainee Brought to U.S. for Trial Move is Part of Obama’s Plan to Close
Prison, Wash. Post, June 10, 2009, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2009/06/09/AR2009060900401.html.

8.

“Allahu Akbar,” which means “Allah is the greatest,” is the opening declaration of every Islamic prayer.
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not target civilians, then you have certain rights, and one thing that happens is you
are held until hostilities are over.
The decision to move KSM was the U.S. government saying that if you violate
all of those rules, you get an even better deal—you get to come to a courtroom, you
get a platform, you get a lawyer, and you get the possibility of an acquittal. In
Christmas of 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian citizen, was caught
trying to set off a bomb in his underwear over Detroit. Instead of being treated as an
intelligence asset, he was treated as a criminal defendant and given Miranda warnings,
notwithstanding the fact that the only advantage of Miranda warnings is that they
allow you to use a statement. Given the fact that Abdulmutallab had committed his
crime in front of a couple of hundred witnesses, the need for his statement is, I think,
open to question.
It is too bad that we did not use Abdulmutallab as an intelligence asset
immediately because the bomb that he tried to set off was the same type of bomb
that would later be used by bomb makers who were shipping packages into this
country several months ago. Had we been able to find out where Abdulmutallab had
gotten his training and who trained him, that incident could conceivably have been
prevented. After the incident, the director of National Intelligence suggested that
Abdulmutallab should have been interrogated right away under the program for
interrogating high-value detainees. This program was supposed to replace the CIA
program that had been abolished right after the inauguration of President Obama.
The trouble was that the program was not functional at the time Abdulmutallab was
captured.
Although that program was not up and running, I should tell you that the
reopened investigation of the CIA agents who conducted the interrogations, which
had been closed years before, was very much up and running and was calling
witnesses before the grand jury at the time. This, I think, is a very eloquent illustration
of the priorities that were in force.
On May 1, 2010, the New York City Police Department discovered a primitive
explosive device in an SUV parked near Times Square in New York City. If it had
gone off, it would have killed hundreds; but it did not, of course, and the incident
was treated dismissively at the beginning by many, including by New York City
Mayor Michael Bloomberg, who said he thought it would ultimately be found that
the device had been planted by somebody who was upset about the health care reform
bill.
It turned out that the person who planted the bomb, Faisal Shahzad, if he had
any views about the health care bill, had not been motivated by them when he set the
device. In fact, he had been trained by the Pakistan Taliban, who helped him do it.
Even though the principal value of both Shahzad and Abdulmutallab when they
were captured was as intelligence assets, the main emphasis was on criminal
prosecution. And as a result of this emphasis, a rich trove of information, I would
suggest to you, was forfeited.
The Ghailani trial appears to have been intended as a demonstration to show
that we could try any Guantánamo detainee in a civilian court and thus serve as the
17
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basis for an argument that the expressed concerns over trying Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed here in a civilian court were misplaced. Inasmuch as Ghailani had been
indicted years before, the case had been investigated years before as a case that was to
be presented in a federal court, rather than as a case based on evidence captured on
the battlefield.
In other words, even if the trial of Ghailani had been a complete success, it
would not have shown that we could try Guantánamo detainees in a civilian court.
However, the trial was not a success; it failed in a number of respects, including
suppression of the testimony of a key witness against Ghailani, and it resulted in his
acquittal on a couple hundred murder counts. Ghailani was convicted on only one
count, and that was conspiracy to destroy government property resulting in death.
Since 9/11, more than two dozen Islamist plots have been aimed at this country,
including not only those of Major Hasan, Abdulmutallab, and Shahzad, but also
those of Najibullah-I Zazi and his cohorts, who are under prosecution in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York for an alleged plot to detonate
explosives in the United States; Bryant Neal Vinas and his plot against commuter
railroads and subways in this city; plotters who planned attacks on military personnel
at Fort Dix, Quantico, Virginia, and Goose Creek, South Carolina; individuals who
murdered an army recruiter in Little Rock, Arkansas, and planned to blow up a
synagogue in Riverdale, New York, an office building in Dallas, and a courthouse in
Illinois; and many, many others.
Yet, the criminal law paradigm is still setting the limit of the response. Attorney
General Holder continues to press for a civilian trial for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
and others. Holder says that is not off the table; they were scheduled long ago to
begin their military trials at Guantánamo. Nashiri was supposed to have already
been tried at Guantánamo in connection with the USS Cole bombing. His trial began
and then it was stopped. We are now told that his trial has been put back on the
rails.
It is true that Guantánamo remains open, but it is also true that President Obama
remains committed as ever to closing it and to figuring out a way to release those
who are there, despite a growing body of evidence that alumni of Guantánamo have
returned to the battlefield in startling numbers. An interview with a man named
Sheikh Abu Sufyan Al-Azdi provides a recent example. Al-Azdi is a deputy
commander of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which is a group based in Yemen.
This interview was published in the October 2010 issue of al-Qaeda’s English
magazine called Inspire.9 For those of you do not have a subscription to Inspire, I will
tell you that you can get a copy of the article on a website called Middle East Media
Research Institute (MEMRI), which translates articles of that sort and others. It is a
real eye-opener. Al-Azdi, who was released from Guantánamo, was turned over to
the Saudis for participation in their celebrated re-education program. However,
9.

MEMRI, http://www.memrijttm.org/content/en/report.htm?report=3961&param=APT (last visited
June 1, 2011) (subscription required); see also Interview with Shaykh Abu Sufyan: The Vice Emir of Al-Qaida
in the Arabian Peninsula, Flashpoint Partners (Oct. 11, 2010), http://www.f lashpoint-intel.com/
images/documents/pdf/1010/flashpoint_abusufyaninspire1010.pdf.
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Al-Azdi made his way back to Yemen to resume his jihadi activities. In the Inspire
interview, Al-Azdi urges Muslims to emulate Hasan, the Fort Hood shooter, and
Abdulmutallab, the Detroit airplane bomber. Al-Azdi is by no means the first
alumnus to return to the battlefield. In March of 2010, the operational leader of the
Afghan Taliban announced that he was promoting an alumnus of Guantánamo to
replace someone who had been killed by one of our drones.
In fact, more than twenty percent of those released from Guantánamo have
returned to the battlefield, and those are just the ones we know about because they
have been recaptured or killed in battle. How many others are still out there? We
have no idea. With respect to Guantánamo, there is something of a constitutional
standoff at the moment. President Obama wants to close Guantánamo and bring
those who are still there to the United States. Congress has said that Obama may not
use funds appropriated by Congress for that purpose, and so they are at an impasse.
One alternative that some in the Obama administration, and some outsiders, have
urged is indefinite detention at Guantánamo with no trials, at least until after the
2012 presidential election.
That indefinite detention option has gotten backing even from some highly
respected people outside the government, including a man named Jack Goldsmith, a
former assistant U.S. attorney general and someone with whom I ordinarily agree.
Make no mistake: I am not here as a proponent of military commissions as a policy
matter—although I think the fact that Congress has passed the Military Commissions
Act and re-enacted it at the behest of this current administration makes it barely
short of lawless for the administration to refuse to use military commissions. But I
certainly agree that the record of proceedings in that forum is not encouraging. For
example, Omar Khadr, who at the age of 15, without disclosing his identity as a
combatant, threw a hand grenade that killed one U.S. soldier and maimed another.
Khadr was tried at Guantánamo and was allowed to plead guilty to get a sentence
that was capped at eight years. Khadr was further allowed to serve the remainder of
his sentence in his native Canada, where the laws are such that he is likely to be out
in a year or two.
That sentence itself was harsh compared to the sentence of Osama bin Laden’s
bodyguard and confidant, a man named Salim Hamdan, who gave his name to a
famous Supreme Court case.10 Hamdan was bin Laden’s driver and was captured
while in possession of two missiles that were intended for use on U.S. soldiers.
Anybody who is familiar with organized crime cases knows that the driver is probably
the most trusted member of the family. The driver is closest to the boss, he is the one
who is responsible for the boss’s safety, and he is the one who hears everything.
Notwithstanding that, the military judge could not get his mind around the fact that
Hamdan was anything more than a mere driver. The prosecution asked for thirty
years. Hamdan got something short of eight and was released immediately because
he had already been in custody for longer than that.

10.

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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On the other hand, as I said earlier, trying unlawful combatants in civilian court
disregards the Military Commissions Act and essentially provides them better
treatment than what is accorded to those who obey the laws of war. So what are we
to do? One thing that perhaps ought to be done is to go back to first principles and
ask why it is we want to have trials, if we even want to have trials.
After World War II, the Allied Forces held the Nuremberg Trials, essentially for
two reasons: one was to create a record of what the people involved in the Nazi
regime had done, and the second reason was punishment. Not everybody at the time
favored the Nuremberg Tribunals. Winston Churchill, in fact, favored summary
execution for the senior leadership of the German government; he did not see any
need for trials. Today we do not need the recordkeeping feature of Nuremberg
because we have a record of precisely what these people have done and why they have
done it. I do not think that simple indefinite detention, or even summary execution,
is a reasonable choice because it fails to provide for what I think the public has a
legitimate, basic right to and a societal need for. And that is to affix moral blame and
to impose an appropriate punishment. That is why we have a justice system.
We have, essentially, a social contract, as you know, in which people give up their
right to use force in return for the assurance that their government will use force on
their behalf when necessary. Telling the families of those who were killed on 9/11
not to worry because we are going to have these people in custody indefinitely, I
would suggest to you, is a failure on the government’s part of the social contract.
One solution that is available to Congress is to exercise its constitutional power
to create a court to try terrorism cases. Article III creates only the Supreme Court. It
then says that Congress may from time to time ordain and establish such other courts
as it deems necessary.11 Congress has the power to create courts. Therefore, Congress
can create a court that can consider any relevant evidence, is not bound by the rules
of evidence, and can be fashioned to try these cases. This court could be presided
over by an Article III judge, with the military providing juries and prosecutors.
That is one alternative that has been proposed and there has been a lot written on
it. This is not the time to get into a detailed description of how the court would
work. But that is certainly one alternative to what we have now. The executive
branch, I think, needs to focus on the nature of the adversary that we are confronting.
Strategically, there has been not only a failure but an outright act of refusal to consider
the nature of the adversary we confront, and that is an adversary that is motivated by
a religiously derived ideology that essentially offers to infidels three choices:
conversion, dhimmitude,12 or death. We live in a culture, as I said before, in which
we hesitate to ask questions about other people’s religion. But when that religion is
something they use as a justification for imposing a system on us, we are very well
entitled to ask questions about it and draw appropriate conclusions.
11.

U.S. Const. art. III.

12.

See David B. Kopel, Dhimmitude and Disarmament, 18 Geo. Mason U. C.R. L.J. 305, 305 (2008)
(“Islamic law, shari’a, forbids non-Muslims, known as dhimmi, from possessing arms and defending
themselves from attacks by Muslims. The disarmament is one aspect of the pervasive civil inferiority
imposed on non-Muslims, a status known as dhimmitude.”).
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Because we are facing a militant ideology that is not focused in any one particular
place, the only way that we can prevail is to try to stay one jump ahead of those who
are intent on translating that ideology into concrete action. The only way to do that
is through intelligence gathering, both electronic intelligence and, when we can get
it, human intelligence. I would not downplay, as many people have, the value of
human intelligence. General Michael Hayden, the former director of the CIA, said
that trying to work based only on electronic intelligence is like trying to solve a
jigsaw puzzle without looking at the picture on the box. Occasionally, we get hold of
a person who can describe the picture on the box and that is enormously invaluable.
However, if we have a program for questioning potentially valuable detainees
that is limited to the Army Field Manual, which is already available on the web as a
training manual, then we are going to get virtually nothing from the questioning.
There are certainly those in the intelligence community who understand the nature
of the threat and the importance of the intelligence in dealing with the threat. But
those in charge appear to be strategically myopic. The President’s special assistant,
Deputy National Security Advisor John Brennan, made a speech last year at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies. This speech was given in 2010 by one
of the White House’s designated deep thinkers on the subject of terrorism. He said
that to speak of a war on terrorism or a war on terror is highly misleading because
terrorism is simply a tactic and terror is a state of mind.
When I heard that speech, I thought back to a great comedic routine that was
part of a show called Beyond the Fringe, which was a revue that ran on Broadway.
One of the wonderful bits in that revue involved a harassed Scotland Yard spokesman
trying to explain why it was that Scotland Yard had failed to solve the Great Train
Robbery of 1963. The spokesman said that Scotland Yard had been very confused by
the name: the Great Train Robbery. He said that trains are very large, they are hard
to conceal, they run on rails, and it is very difficult to make off with them. He said
that we have investigated this and have found that there is no question at all of a
missing train. We have the train; it is the contents of the train that are missing.
That is a very funny bit but it is part of a British farce. The President and the
national security advisor did not, so far as I know, intend themselves to be participating
in a British farce when the Deputy National Security Advisor spoke at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies about the War on Terror. When he got to the
subject of jihad, he cautioned against describing our enemies as jihadists because, as
he put it, jihad is “a holy struggle, a legitimate tenet of Islam.” And just so nobody
missed the point, he said that jihad means simply, as he put it, “to purify oneself or
one’s community.”13 This person, by the way, says he believes that a twenty percent
recidivism rate from Guantánamo is actually not bad because it compares favorably
with the recidivism rate in U.S. federal institutions, notwithstanding that we have a
much more accurate way of keeping track of the alumni of federal institutions than
of the alumni of Guantánamo.
13.

Counterterror Adviser Defends Jihad as ‘Legitimate Tenet of Islam,’ Fox News (May 27, 2010), http://www.
foxnews.com/politics/2010/05/27/counterterror-adviser-defends-jihad-legitimate-tenet-islam/.
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Now, we can wish Muslims of a reformist bent all the luck in the world without
forgetting that it is going to take a struggle within Islam, and not just wishful
thinking, to change the meaning of jihad or at least the lengths to which some
Muslims are willing to go in following it. Jihad may indeed involve purification, but
only in the sense of intensifying one’s own commitment to calling others to the faith,
spreading Shari’a law, and purifying one’s community of all non-Islamic influences.
We can wish reform-minded Muslims and moderate Muslims all the luck in the
world without forgetting that the struggle to spread Shari’a by peaceful means, if
possible, but by violent means, if necessary, is, in fact, the meaning of jihad within
the religion.
Now, I recognize that all religions, my own included, have universalist visions
and look forward to the day when all people worship in accordance with them. But
where they differ sharply is on how far they command people to go in bringing that
day about. For the people in charge to overlook that, or if they have not overlooked
it, to try to get other people to overlook it is, I suggest to you, a bad way to lead us.
And that, regrettably, is where we are.
*******
Question and Answer Session

Question: Could you elaborate on your opposition to military commissions, which
you said, as a public policy matter, you were not in favor of. And if we do not have
civilian trials in the United States and we do not have military commissions, what
alternative do you propose?
Judge Mukasey: We have had military commissions since the American Revolution.
There was a military commission that convened as late as World War II when
German saboteurs landed off Long Island, New York, and Florida in 1943 and were
captured. On direct orders of the President, they were not taken to a civilian court;
rather, they were put before a military commission, tried, and executed within three
months. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court opinion upholding that entire procedure
was issued after they were dead. However, we do not have any experience with
military commissions on a long-term basis, and military commissions are something
apart from the normal mandate of the military. The military services are there to
fight and win wars, and military commissions are, from their standpoint, a sideshow.
And justifiably so; I don’t mean this as a criticism of them. They are not within the
mainstream of the mandate of the military. There is no promotion track for being
successful long-term by prosecuting military commission cases. People do a limited
term in the commissions and then move on to something else. There is no long-term
mechanism in place, and I think there has to be a long-term mechanism in place,
which is why I suggested creating a terrorism court. I think civilian courts create
enormous security concerns, not to mention the fact that when we bring people
within the reach of federal courts what we invite and what we are going to get—
because the lawyers involved have announced that is what we are going to get—is a
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wave of litigation addressing the facts and the conditions of confinement of people
who are brought here. And federal courts are going to be basically imposed upon
with an enormous wave of litigation over each of these people.
There are several hundred federal judges across the country. And I have to tell
you that I yield to no one, at least to no one except several federal judges, in my
admiration for the federal judiciary. However, there is always one federal judge who
will release somebody on a habeas corpus writ on a claim that the person’s confinement
is no longer warranted. That is not possible at Guantánamo, but it is possible once
people get to the United States. And it will be particularly possible when and if we
start withdrawing troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, which will then give rise to the
claim that the war is over and therefore we cannot continue to hold people. So I find
that part of it enormously dangerous, which is why I believe in a separate court.
Question: I love your analogy to the Great Train Robbery—that the train has not
been stolen, rather the contents have been stolen. The contents of our freedom and
liberty have been stolen, not the U.S. Constitution, so to speak. What is your remedy
for getting back the contents of the Constitution?
Judge Mukasey: I am at a loss to know which of our liberties have been stolen. As
far as I know, everybody remains free and, if you consult the blogs, remains quite
free to launch whatever criticism and protest they want, fact-based and otherwise. I
have never seen such a procession of people line up at microphones like this to
complain that their free speech rights are being suppressed.
Question: I am not complaining, and I am very much appreciative of your
wonderful analogy. I am just concerned about how we get back the sense of freedom
that we had. I think that is a better question.
Judge Mukasey: We get back the sense of freedom that we had when we stop
having to wake up every morning wondering whether a bomb is going to go off in
the subways.
Question: Do you still feel that the CIA enhanced interrogation techniques had
sufficient legal support in the OLC memos that John Yoo and Bob Delahunt and
others were involved in producing?
Judge Mukasey: The short answer to your question, until you got to the last part
of it, was yes. As far as John Yoo’s memos are concerned, those were withdrawn. I
think that they were not well done and they had been redone. What is interesting
about the fact that they were redone is the fact that the same conclusions were
reached, namely, that the techniques were lawful. Torture has a meaning. It is not
just an expression.
As far as the enhanced interrogation techniques having sufficient legal support,
there is a statute that bars the use of torture and defines torture as acting under color
of law for the purpose of causing severe physical or mental pain or suffering. Mental
pain or suffering is defined as having long-term consequences. Water boarding, I
will tell you, creates virtually no physical pain and has no long-term consequences.
Water boarding is used in Survival Evasion Resistance Escape (SERE) training for
U.S. Army Special Forces and for Navy SEALS. And it has to be used with great
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discretion in SERE training because it can be very demoralizing; the trainees always
give up whatever it is they are trying to hold back.
Question: I think you would recognize that there was extreme revulsion among
the American people generally when it was learned what water boarding techniques
were like.
Judge Mukasey: I recognize that there was extreme revulsion against a general
concept of water boarding based on what the Japanese did during World War II and
what the Khmer Rouge did later on. This water boarding today bears no relation to
that earlier form of water boarding. During World War II, the Japanese laid people
down, pumped water down their stomachs, and then stood on their abdomens to
push the water back up. They also forced them to eat raw rice and pumped water
down their stomachs and waited until it distended and caused enormous pain. That
is not what the CIA did. The Khmer Rouge handcuffed people to the bottom of
barrels and poured water in until it reached over their heads. That was their idea of
water boarding. Again, that is not what the CIA did. I will tell you that only three
people, the three people I previously discussed—Zubaydah, KSM, and Nashiri—
were water boarded. That is it.
Water boarding involves tying somebody down to a board, putting a cloth over
his face, pouring water over his nose and mouth, and holding your hand over the
cloth for periods of between twenty and forty seconds so that he cannot move his
head to get the water away. That is it. What it creates is the panic that comes with
drowning, and it creates this panic even if you know you are not drowning, which
you know, of course, by the second or third time they do it. The trainees who undergo
SERE training know that they are not going to be drowned, but it still works every
single time. It works to force people to be cooperative.
And it is not, by the way, a question of trying to get confessions out of people. I
will concede that if you had water boarded KSM enough, he would have confessed to
having shot Abraham Lincoln. Confessions are not the point; rather, intelligence is.
When somebody lies to you in the course of questioning, you take them out and you
engage in coercive techniques with the authorization of somebody at the deputy level
or higher within the CIA. You then wait until he becomes more cooperative and
then somebody who does the questioning comes in. It is not the same person the
entire time.
And the result is certainly not engaging in that technique until somebody
discloses a particular piece of information and then running out and using the
information. You take the information that you get, fit it into the grid of information
that you already have to determine what it is that you are getting. What we received
was enormously valuable and water boarding was not the only technique used. There
were a whole lot of other unattractive techniques being used, such as sleep deprivation
and walling, which involves banging somebody into a hollowed-out wall that makes
a sound as if he is being pushed with a whole lot more force than he is, as well as
open-handed slaps to the side of the head and the abdomen.
Question: Obviously, you are in sharp disagreement with the current attorney
general on a lot of issues.
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Judge Mukasey: I have some policy disagreements with him, but I have some
agreements with him, too. I think that the current Justice Department has been, in a
quiet sort of way, enormously aggressive about pursuing leak cases. And I applaud
them for that. I am deadly serious. I think that is an enormous problem, and they are
serious about cracking down on it.
Question: How much more difficult is it to conduct our anti-terrorist and antijihad operations or relations with other countries when the current administration is
not sympathetic to the techniques you described, the sanctions, or the attitude that
you show? There is such a sharp difference between what you say and think and the
way that anti-terrorism activities are now being conducted. Is that impeding our
ability to fight and prevent further incidents?
Judge Mukasey: It is not something that I can prove. I cited the Abdulmutallab
incident and the incident in Times Square as examples of situations in which we
could have gotten intelligence, but we did not. I do not know what other incidents
there were or how many other incidences there were, but what I am saying is that
going back to a criminal law paradigm is no way to do it. But that said, they have left
in place, and are pursuing, the techniques that were approved for electronic
surveillance. Those techniques are very much in place and obviously come in handy.
But that is only part of the equation.
Question: I would like to go back to your statement with regard to the difference
between the military commissions and the civilian courts. Did I hear correctly that
you found the possible right of acquittal reprehensible in the civilian courts?
Judge Mukasey: No, I did not say that at all. What I said was that the fact of the
acquittal due to the suppression of evidence was a regrettable result. But you cannot
have a trial unless you have the possibility of an acquittal. Otherwise it is not a trial;
it is a show trial. You also have the possibility of an acquittal in military courts; in
fact, military courts generally, including courts-martial, have a higher record of
acquittal than civilian courts. It was the fact and the manner of the acquittal in the
Ghalani case that I objected to, not that acquittal is a reprehensible result.
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